Qubes OS

Fedora 43 templates available for Qubes OS 4.3

Fri, 06 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000

The following new Fedora 43 templates are now available for Qubes OS 4.3:

fedora-43-xfce (default Fedora template with the Xfce desktop environment)
fedora-43 (alternative Fedora template with the GNOME desktop environment)
fedora-43-minimal (minimal template for advanced users)

Note: Fedora 43 template availability for Qubes OS 4.2 will be announced separately.

There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:

Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. This option is simpler for less experienced users, but it won’t preserve any modifications you’ve made to your template. After you install the new template, you’ll have to redo your desired template modifications (if any) and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template. If you choose to modify your template, you may wish to write those modifications down so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.

Note: No user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL).

XSAs released on 2026-01-27

Tue, 27 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is not affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:

(none)

XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:

XSA-477
- This XSA affects only HVMs with shadow paging and tracing enabled. In Qubes OS, shadow paging and tracing are disabled at build time.
XSA-478
- This XSA affects only XAPI, which is an alternative toolstack. Qubes OS uses libxl instead of XAPI.
XSA-479
- This XSA affects only in-VM isolation, which Qubes OS does not rely on for security. We will still provide the fix for this issue at a later date, but it will not be accompanied by a Qubes security bulletin (QSB).

About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

Qubes OS 4.3.0 has been released!

Sun, 21 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000

We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes OS 4.3.0! This minor release includes a host of new features, improvements, and bug fixes. The ISO and associated verification files are available on the downloads page.

What’s new in Qubes 4.3?

Dom0 upgraded to Fedora 41 (#9402).
Xen upgraded to version 4.19 (#9420).
Default Fedora template upgraded to Fedora 42 (older versions not supported).
Default Debian template upgraded to Debian 13 (versions older than 12 not supported).
Default Whonix templates upgraded to Whonix 18 (older versions not supported).
Preloaded disposables (#1512)
Device “self-identity oriented” assignment (a.k.a. New Devices API) (#9325)
Qubes Windows Tools reintroduced with improved features (#1861).

These are just a few highlights from the many changes included in this release. For a more comprehensive list of changes, see the Qubes OS 4.3 release notes.

How to get Qubes OS 4.3.0

If you’d like to install Qubes OS for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there’s never been a better time to do so! Simply download the Qubes 4.3.0 ISO and follow our installation guide.
If you’re currently using Qubes 4.2, learn how to upgrade to Qubes 4.3.
If you’re currently using a Qubes 4.3 release candidate (RC), update normally (which includes upgrading any EOL templates and standalones you might have) in order to make your system effectively equivalent to the stable Qubes 4.3.0 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required.

In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup beforehand.

Known issues in Qubes OS 4.3.0

Templates restored in 4.3.0 from a pre-4.3 backup may continue to target their original Qubes OS release repos (#8701). After restoring such templates in 4.3.0, you must enter the following additional commands in a dom0 terminal:

sudo qubes-dom0-update -y qubes-dist-upgrade
sudo qubes-dist-upgrade --releasever=4.3 --template-standalone-upgrade -y

This will automatically choose the templates that need to be updated. The templates will be shut down during this process.

Fresh templates on a clean 4.3.0 installation are not affected. Users who perform an in-place upgrade from 4.2 to 4.3 (instead of restoring templates from a backup) are also not affected, since the in-place upgrade process already includes the above fix in stage 4. For more information, see issue #8701.

View the full list of known bugs affecting Qubes 4.3 in our issue tracker.

Support for older releases

In accordance with our release support policy, Qubes 4.2 will remain supported for six months after the release of Qubes 4.3, until 2026-06-21. After that, Qubes 4.2 will no longer receive security updates or bug fixes.

Whonix templates are created and supported by our partner, the Whonix Project. The Whonix Project has set its own support policy for Whonix templates in Qubes. For more information, see the Whonix Support Schedule.

Thank you to our partners, donors, contributors, and testers!

This release would not be possible without generous support from our partners and donors, as well as contributions from our active community members, especially bug reports from our testers. We are eternally grateful to our excellent community for making the Qubes OS Project a great example of open-source collaboration.

Qubes Canary 045

Wed, 10 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000

We have published Qubes Canary 045. The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.

Qubes Canary 045

                    ---===[ Qubes Canary 045 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is December 10, 2025.

2. There have been 109 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

       427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
   Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
   backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
   fourteen days of March 2026. Special note should be taken if no new
   canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
   without plausible explanation.


Special announcements
----------------------

None.


Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.


Proof of freshness
-------------------

Wed, 10 Dec 2025 01:14:56 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Confidential Conference on Ukraine Peace: "We Must Not Leave Ukraine and Volodymyr Alone with These Guys"
Project 2025 Author: "We Won't Let Anyone Stop US from Using Our Oil and Gas"
Remnants of the War: Syrians from Germany Helping with Reconstruction - But Remain Wary of Moving Back
Germany's Queen Mum: Nostalgia for the Merkel Era Alive and Well
Director Nadav Lapid on Israel after Gaza: It Was Our Duty to Scream

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Hundreds of Thousands of Thais and Cambodians Flee
Canada’s Northwest Territories Diamond Mines Are Closing
Another Front in the War in Ukraine: Who Gets to Claim a Famed Artist?
With Cheap Tickets and Lax Etiquette, a Theater Builds an Older Fan Base
Between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a Trade War With No End in Sight

Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Trump criticises 'decaying' European countries and 'weak' leaders
Nobel officials unsure when Peace Prize winner will arrive for ceremony
Congress ups pressure to release boat strike video with threat to Hegseth's travel budget
French feminists outraged by Brigitte Macron's comment about activists
'What's your name?' - Moment police confront Luigi Mangione at McDonald's

Source: Blockchain.info
0000000000000000000028650dc7d328ea9c1b7e2b5376ce14089586c8ca3041


Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Source: canary-045-2025.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature

Source: canary-045-2025.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature

Source: canary-045-2025.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.

What is a Qubes canary?

A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong.

The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)

Why should I care about canaries?

Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way.

What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?

Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:

Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Canaries include a set of numbered statements at the top. These statements are generally the same across canaries, except for specific numbers and dates that have changed since the previous canary. If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.

No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:

Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of the statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).

In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it (with valid signatures), you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?

A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?

If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced.

Alternatively, an adversary could fabricate a canary in an attempt to deceive the public. Such a canary would not be validly signed, but users who neglect to check the signatures on the fake canary would not be aware of this, so they may mistakenly believe it to be genuine, especially if it closely mimics the language of authentic canaries. Such falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.)

Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1

(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.)

View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
   
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
gpg> fpr
pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
 Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.

Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.

Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

gpg> trust
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
   
  1 = I don't know or won't say
  2 = I do NOT trust
  3 = I trust marginally
  4 = I trust fully
  5 = I trust ultimately
  m = back to the main menu
   
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
   
gpg> q

Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.

Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.)

$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg:               imported: 16
gpg:              unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u

Verify signed Git tags.

$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
   
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]

The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.

Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]

Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.

For this announcement (Qubes Canary 045), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify canary-045-2025.txt.sig.marmarek canary-045-2025.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-045-2025.txt.sig.simon canary-045-2025.txt

You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 045 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

Qubes OS 4.3.0-rc4 is available for testing

Sat, 06 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000

We’re pleased to announce that the fourth release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.3.0 is now available for testing. This minor release includes many new features and improvements over Qubes OS 4.2.

What’s new in Qubes 4.3?

Dom0 upgraded to Fedora 41 (#9402).
Xen upgraded to version 4.19 (#9420).
Default Fedora template upgraded to Fedora 42 (older versions not supported).
Default Debian template upgraded to Debian 13 (versions older than 12 not supported).
Default Whonix templates upgraded to Whonix 18 (upgraded from 17.4.3 in RC2; versions older than 18 no longer supported).
Preloaded disposables (#1512)
Device “self-identity oriented” assignment (a.k.a. New Devices API) (#9325)
Qubes Windows Tools reintroduced with improved features (#1861).

These are just a few highlights from the many changes included in this release. For a more comprehensive list of changes, see the Qubes OS 4.3 release notes.

When is the stable release?

That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our release schedule documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with an RC that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses.

Barring any surprises uncovered by testing, we expect this fourth RC to be the final one, which means that we hope to declare this RC to be the stable 4.3.0 release at the conclusion of its testing period.

How to test Qubes 4.3.0-rc4

Thanks to those who tested earlier 4.3 RCs and reported bugs they encountered, 4.3.0-rc4 now includes fixes for several bugs that were present in those prior RCs!

If you’d like to help us test this RC, you can upgrade to Qubes 4.3.0-rc4 with either a clean installation or an in-place upgrade from Qubes 4.2. (Note for in-place upgrade testers: qubes-dist-upgrade now requires --releasever=4.3 and may require --enable-current-testing for testing releases like this RC.) As always, we strongly recommend making a full backup beforehand and updating Qubes OS immediately afterward in order to apply all available bug fixes.

If you’re currently using an earlier 4.3 RC and wish to update to 4.3.0-rc4, please update normally with current-testing enabled. If you use Whonix, please also upgrade from Whonix 17 to 18, if you have not already done so.

Please help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter. If you’re an experienced user, we encourage you to join the testing team.

Known issues in Qubes OS 4.3.0-rc4

It is possible that templates restored in 4.3.0-rc4 from a pre-4.3 backup may continue to target their original Qubes OS release repos. This does not affect fresh templates on a clean 4.3.0-rc4 installation. For more information, see issue #8701.

View the full list of known bugs affecting Qubes 4.3 in our issue tracker.

What’s a release candidate?

A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases and the version scheme in our documentation.

What’s a minor release?

The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning standard. Version numbers are written as [major].[minor].[patch]. Hence, releases that increment the second value are known as “minor releases.” Minor releases generally include new features, improvements, and bug fixes that are backward-compatible with earlier versions of the same major release. See our supported releases for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases and our version scheme documentation for more information about how Qubes OS releases are versioned.

The Qubes OS Project will be at FOSDEM 2026!

Sun, 16 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The Qubes OS Project will have a stand at FOSDEM 2026, which will take place in Brussels, Belgium on January 31 and February 1, 2026. FOSDEM is a top annual meeting for free and open source software developers. Entry is free, and no registration is required. If you attend, stop by and say hello!

Fedora 41 approaching end of life

Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Fedora 41 is currently scheduled to reach end of life (EOL) on 2025-11-19 (approximately two weeks from the date of this announcement). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL.

There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:

Recommended: Install a new template to replace an existing one. This option is simpler for less experienced users, but it won’t preserve any modifications you’ve made to your template. After you install the new template, you’ll have to redo your desired template modifications (if any) and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template. If you choose to modify your template, you may wish to write those modifications down so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.

Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL).

Debian 13 templates available

Thu, 30 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The following new Debian 13 templates are now available for both Qubes OS 4.2 (stable) and Qubes OS 4.3 (release candidates):

debian-13-xfce (default Debian template with the Xfce desktop environment)
debian-13 (alternative Debian template with the GNOME desktop environment)
debian-13-minimal (minimal template for advanced users)

There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Debian release:

Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace the existing one. This option is simpler for less experienced users, but it won’t preserve any modifications you’ve made to your template. After you install the new template, you’ll have to redo your desired template modifications (if any) and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template. If you choose to modify your template, you may wish to write those modifications down so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. In the old Debian template, see /var/log/dpkg.log and /var/log/apt/history.log for logs of package manager actions.
Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Debian template. This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.

Note: No user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL).

Qubes OS 4.3.0-rc3 is available for testing

Mon, 27 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000

We’re pleased to announce that the third release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.3.0 is now available for testing. This minor release includes many new features and improvements over Qubes OS 4.2.

What’s new in Qubes 4.3?

Dom0 upgraded to Fedora 41 (#9402).
Xen upgraded to version 4.19 (#9420).
Default Fedora template upgraded to Fedora 42 (versions older than 41 not supported).
Default Debian template upgraded to Debian 13 (versions older than 12 not supported).
Default Whonix templates upgraded to Whonix 18 (upgraded from 17.4.3 in RC2; versions older than 18 no longer supported).
Preloaded disposables (#1512)
Device “self-identity oriented” assignment (a.k.a. New Devices API) (#9325)
Qubes Windows Tools reintroduced with improved features (#1861).

These are just a few highlights from the many changes included in this release. For a more comprehensive list of changes, see the Qubes OS 4.3 release notes.

When is the stable release?

At this time, we expect that there will likely be a fourth release candidate, which will probably be the final one.

How to test Qubes 4.3.0-rc3

Thanks to those who tested earlier 4.3 RCs and reported bugs they encountered, 4.3.0-rc3 now includes fixes for several bugs that were present in those prior RCs!

If you’d like to help us test this RC, you can upgrade to Qubes 4.3.0-rc3 with either a clean installation or an in-place upgrade from Qubes 4.2. (Note for in-place upgrade testers: qubes-dist-upgrade now requires --releasever=4.3 and may require --enable-current-testing for testing releases like this RC.) As always, we strongly recommend making a full backup beforehand and updating Qubes OS immediately afterward in order to apply all available bug fixes.

If you’re currently using an earlier 4.3 RC and wish to update to 4.3.0-rc3, please update normally with current-testing enabled. If you use Whonix, please also upgrade from Whonix 17 to 18.

Please help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter. If you’re an experienced user, we encourage you to join the testing team.

Known issues in Qubes OS 4.3.0-rc3

It is possible that templates restored in 4.3.0-rc3 from a pre-4.3 backup may continue to target their original Qubes OS release repos. This does not affect fresh templates on a clean 4.3.0-rc3 installation. For more information, see issue #8701.

View the full list of known bugs affecting Qubes 4.3 in our issue tracker.

What’s a release candidate?

What’s a minor release?

XSAs released on 2025-10-24

Fri, 24 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is not affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:

(none)

XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:

XSA-476
- Qubes OS does not hot unplug PCI devices.

Qubes OS

Fedora 43 templates available for Qubes OS 4.3

XSAs released on 2026-01-27

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

About this announcement

Qubes OS 4.3.0 has been released!

What’s new in Qubes 4.3?

How to get Qubes OS 4.3.0

Known issues in Qubes OS 4.3.0

Support for older releases

Thank you to our partners, donors, contributors, and testers!

Qubes Canary 045

Qubes Canary 045

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature

What is the purpose of this announcement?

What is a Qubes canary?

Why should I care about canaries?

What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?

Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?

What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?

Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?

Qubes OS 4.3.0-rc4 is available for testing

What’s new in Qubes 4.3?

When is the stable release?

How to test Qubes 4.3.0-rc4

Known issues in Qubes OS 4.3.0-rc4

What’s a release candidate?

What’s a minor release?

The Qubes OS Project will be at FOSDEM 2026!

Fedora 41 approaching end of life

Debian 13 templates available

Qubes OS 4.3.0-rc3 is available for testing

What’s new in Qubes 4.3?

When is the stable release?

How to test Qubes 4.3.0-rc3

Known issues in Qubes OS 4.3.0-rc3

What’s a release candidate?

What’s a minor release?

XSAs released on 2025-10-24

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

About this announcement