Firewall

Introduction

This page explains use of the firewall in Qubes 4.2, using nftables.
In Qubes 4.1, all firewall components used iptables. For details of that usage see here

Understanding firewalling in Qubes

Every qube in Qubes is connected to the network via a FirewallVM, which is used to enforce network-level policies. By default there is one default FirewallVM, but the user is free to create more, if needed.

For more information, see the following:

How to edit rules

In order to edit rules for a given qube, select it in the Qube Manager and press the “firewall” button.

r4.0-manager-firewall.png

If the qube is running, you can open Settings from the Qube Popup Menu.

ICMP and DNS are not accessible in the GUI, but can be changed via qvm-firewall described below. Connections to Updates Proxy are not made over a network so can not be allowed or blocked with firewall rules, but are controlled using the relevant policy file (see R4.x Updates proxy for more detail).

Note that if you specify a rule by DNS name it will be resolved to IP(s) at the moment of applying the rules, and not on the fly for each new connection. This means it will not work for servers using load balancing, and traffic to complex web sites which draw from many servers will be difficult to control.

Instead of using the firewall GUI, you can use the qvm-firewall command in Dom0 to edit the firewall rules by hand. This gives you greater control than by using the GUI.

The firewall rules for each qube are saved in an XML file in that qube’s directory in dom0:

/var/lib/qubes/appvms/<vm-name>/firewall.xml

Rules are implemented on the netvm.

You can also manually create rules in the qube itself using standard firewalling controls. See Where to put firewall rules. In complex cases, it might be appropriate to load a ruleset using nft -f /path/to/ruleset called from /rw/config/rc.local, the ruleset file can be populated from the current ruleset using nft list ruleset > /path/to/ruleset, you should add flush ruleset at the top of the file to remove all existing rules before loading them. if you do this, be aware that rc.local is called after the network is up, so local rules should not be relied upon to block leaks.

Reconnecting qubes after a NetVM reboot

Normally Qubes doesn’t let the user stop a NetVM if there are other qubes running which use it as their own NetVM. But in case the NetVM stops for whatever reason (e.g. it crashes, or the user forces its shutdown via qvm-kill via terminal in Dom0), Qubes R4.x will often automatically repair the connection. If it does not, then there is an easy way to restore the connection to the NetVM by issuing in dom0:

qvm-prefs <vm> netvm <netvm>

Normally qubes do not connect directly to the actual NetVM (sys-net by default) which has networking devices, but rather to the default sys-firewall first, and in most cases it would be the NetVM that will crash, e.g. in response to S3 sleep/restore or other issues with WiFi drivers. In that case it is only necessary to issue the above command once, for the sys-firewall (this assumes default VM-naming used by the default Qubes installation):

qvm-prefs sys-firewall netvm sys-net

Network service qubes

Qubes does not support running any networking services (e.g. VPN, local DNS server, IPS, …) directly in a qube that is used to run the Qubes firewall service (usually sys-firewall) for good reasons. In particular, if you want to ensure proper functioning of the Qubes firewall, you should not tinker with nftables rules in such qubes.

Instead, you should deploy a network infrastructure such as

sys-net <--> sys-firewall-1 <--> network service qube <--> sys-firewall-2 <--> [client qubes]

Thereby sys-firewall-1 is only needed if you have other client qubes connected there, or you want to manage the traffic of the local network service qube. The sys-firewall-2 proxy ensures that:

  1. Firewall changes done in the network service qube cannot render the Qubes firewall ineffective.
  2. Changes to the Qubes firewall by the Qubes maintainers cannot lead to unwanted information leakage in combination with user rules deployed in the network service qube.
  3. A compromise of the network service qube does not compromise the Qubes firewall.

If you adopt this model, you should be aware that all traffic will arrive at the network service qube appearing to originate from the IP address of sys-firewall-2.

For the VPN service please also look at the VPN documentation.

Enabling networking between two qubes

Normally any networking traffic between qubes is prohibited for security reasons. However, in special situations, you might want to selectively allow specific qubes to establish networking connectivity between each other. For example, this might be useful in some development work, when you want to test networking code, or to allow file exchange between HVM domains (which do not have Qubes tools installed) via SMB/SSH/NFS protocols.

In order to allow networking from qube A (client) to qube B (server) follow these steps:

  • Make sure both A and B are connected to the same firewall vm (by default all VMs use the same firewall VM).
  • Note the Qubes IP addresses assigned to both qubes. This can be done using the qvm-ls -n command, or via the Qubes Manager using the IP column.
  • Start both qubes, and also open a terminal in the firewall VM
  • In the firewall VM’s terminal enter the following nftables rule:
sudo nft add rule ip qubes custom-forward ip saddr <IP address of A> ip daddr <IP address of B> ct state new,established,related counter accept
  • In qube B’s terminal enter the following nftables rule:
sudo nft add rule qubes custom-input ip saddr <IP address of A> ct state new,established,related counter accept
  • Now you should be able to reach B from A – test it using e.g. ping issued from A. Note however, that this doesn’t allow you to reach A from B – for this you would need two more rules, with A and B swapped.
  • If everything works as expected, then you should write the above nftables rules into firewallVM’s qubes-firewall-user-script script. This script is run when the netvm starts up. You should also write relevant rules in A and B’s rc.local script which is run when the qube is launched. Here’s an example how to update the script:
[user@sys-firewall ~]$ sudo -i
[root@sys-firewall user]# echo "nft add rule ip qubes custom-forward ip saddr 10.137.2.25 ip daddr 10.137.2.6 ct state new,established,related counter accept" >> /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
  • Here is an example how to update rc.local:
[user@B ~]$ sudo -i
[root@B user]# echo "nft add rule qubes custom-input ip saddr 10.137.2.25 accept" >> /rw/config/rc.local

Opening a single TCP port to other network-isolated qube

In the case where a specific TCP port needs to be exposed from a qubes to another one, you do not need to enable networking between them but you can use the qubes RPC service qubes.ConnectTCP.

1. Simple port binding

Consider the following example. mytcp-service qube has a TCP service running on port 444 and untrusted qube needs to access this service.

  • In dom0, add the following to /etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user-networking.policy: (it could be another-other-name.policy – just remember to keep it consistent)

      qubes.ConnectTCP * untrusted @default allow target=mytcp-service
    
  • In untrusted, use the Qubes tool qvm-connect-tcp:

      [user@untrusted #]$ qvm-connect-tcp 444:@default:444
    

Note: The syntax is the same as SSH tunnel handler. The first 444 correspond to the localport destination of untrusted, @default the remote machine and the second 444 to the remote machine port.

The service of mytcp-service running on port 444 is now accessible in untrusted as localhost:444.

Here @default is used to hide the destination qube which is specified in the Qubes RPC policy by target=mytcp-service. Equivalent call is to use the tool as follow:

  [user@untrusted #]$ qvm-connect-tcp ::444

which means to use default local port of unstrusted as the same of the remote port and unspecified destination qube is @default by default in qrexec call.

2. Binding remote port on another local port

Consider now the case where someone prefers to specify the destination qube and use another port in untrusted, for example 10044. Instead of previous case, add

qubes.ConnectTCP * untrusted mytcp-service allow

in /etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user-networking.policy and in untrusted, use the tool as follow:

  [user@untrusted #]$ qvm-connect-tcp 10444:mytcp-service:444

The service of mytcp-service running on port 444 is now accessible in untrusted as localhost:10444.

3. Binding to different qubes using RPC policies

One can go further than the previous examples by redirecting different ports to different qubes. For example, let assume that another qube mytcp-service-bis with a TCP service is running on port 445. If someone wants untrusted to be able to reach this service but port 445 is reserved to mytcp-service-bis then, in dom0, add the following to /etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user-networking.policy:

qubes.ConnectTCP +445 untrusted @default allow target=mytcp-service-bis

In that case, calling qvm-connect-tcp like previous examples, will still bind TCP port 444 of mytcp-service to untrusted but now, calling it with port 445

  [user@untrusted #]$ qvm-connect-tcp ::445

will restrict the binding to only the corresponding TCP port of mytcp-service-bis.

4. Permanent port binding

For creating a permanent port bind between two qubes, systemd can be used. We use the case of the first example. In /rw/config (or any place you find suitable) of qube untrusted, create my-tcp-service.socket with content:

[Unit]
Description=my-tcp-service

[Socket]
ListenStream=127.0.0.1:444
Accept=true

[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target

and my-tcp-service@.service with content:

[Unit]
Description=my-tcp-service

[Service]
ExecStart=qrexec-client-vm '' qubes.ConnectTCP+444
StandardInput=socket
StandardOutput=inherit

In /rw/config/rc.local, append the lines:

cp -r /rw/config/my-tcp-service.socket /rw/config/my-tcp-service@.service /lib/systemd/system/
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl start my-tcp-service.socket

When the qube unstrusted has started (after a first reboot), you can directly access the service of mytcp-service running on port 444 as localhost:444.

Port forwarding to a qube from the outside world

In order to allow a service present in a qube to be exposed to the outside world in the default setup (where the qube has sys-firewall as network VM, which in turn has sys-net as network VM) the following needs to be done:

  • In the sys-net VM:
    • Route packets from the outside world to the sys-firewall VM
    • Allow packets through the sys-net VM firewall
  • In the sys-firewall VM:
    • Route packets from the sys-net VM to the VM
    • Allow packets through the sys-firewall VM firewall
  • In the qube QubeDest:
    • Allow packets through the qube firewall to reach the service

As an example we can take the use case of qube QubeDest running a web server listening on port 443 that we want to expose on our physical interface ens6, but only to our local network 192.168.x.y/24.

Note: To have all interfaces available and configured, make sure the 3 qubes are up and running

Note: Issue #4028 discusses adding a command to automate exposing the port.

1. Identify the IP addresses you will need to use for sys-net, sys-firewall and the destination qube.

You can get this information using various methods, but only the first one can be used for sys-net outside world IP:

  • by running this command in each qube: ip -4 -br a | grep UP
  • using qvm-ls -n
  • in the Qubes Manager window using the column IP
  • from the Settings Window for the qube

Note the IP addresses you will need, they will be required in the next steps.

Note: The vifx.0 interface is the one used by qubes connected to this netvm so it is not an outside world interface.

2. Route packets from the outside world to the FirewallVM

For the following example, we assume that the physical interface ens6 in sys-net is on the local network 192.168.x.y with the IP 192.168.x.n, and that the IP address of sys-firewall is 10.137.1.z.

In the sys-net VM’s Terminal, the first step is to to define an ntables chain that will receive DNAT rules to relay the network traffic on a given port to the qube NetVM, we recommend to define a new chain for each destination qube to ease rules management:

nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority filter +1 ; policy accept; }'

Note: the name custom-dnat-qubeDST is arbitrary

Note: while we use a DNAT chain for a single qube, it’s totally possible to have a single DNAT chain for multiple qubes

Second step, code a natting firewall rule to route traffic on the outside interface for the service to the sys-firewall VM

nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iif == "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.1.z

Third step, code the appropriate new filtering firewall rule to allow new connections for the service

nft add rule qubes custom-forward iif == "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.1.z tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept

Note: If you do not wish to limit the IP addresses connecting to the service, remove ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 from the rules

If you want to expose the service on multiple interfaces, repeat the steps 2 and 3 described above, for each interface.

Verify the rules on sys-net firewall correctly match the packets you want by looking at its counters, check for the counter lines in the chains custom-forward and custom-dnat-qubeDEST:

nft list table ip qubes-firewall

In this example, we can see 7 packets in the forward rule, and 3 packets in the dnat rule:

chain custom-forward {
  iif "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.1.z tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter packets 7 bytes 448 accept
}

chain custom-dnat-qubeDEST {
  type nat hook prerouting priority filter + 1; policy accept;
  iif "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter packets 3 bytes 192 dnat to 10.138.33.59
}

(Optional) You can send a test packet by trying to connect to the service from an external device using the following command:

telnet 192.168.x.n 443

Once you have confirmed that the counters increase, store the commands used in the previous steps in /rw/config/rc.local so they get set on sys-net start-up:

[user@sys-net user]$ sudo -i
[root@sys-net user]# nano /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script

Content of /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script in sys-net:

#!/bin/sh

# create the dnat chain for qubeDEST if it doesn't already exist
if nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority filter +1 ; policy accept; }'
then
  # create the dnat rule
  nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iif == "ens6" saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.1.z

  # allow forwarded traffic
  nft add rule qubes custom-forward iif == "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.1.z tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
fi

3. Route packets from the FirewallVM to the VM

For the following example, we use the fact that the physical interface of sys-firewall, facing sys-net, is eth0. Furthermore, we assume that the target VM running the web server has the IP address 10.137.0.xx and that the IP address of sys-firewall is 10.137.1.z.

In the sys-firewall VM’s Terminal, add a DNAT chain that will contain routing rules:

nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority filter +1 ; policy accept; }'

Second step, code a natting firewall rule to route traffic on the outside interface for the service to the destination qube

nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iif == "eth0" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.0.xx

Third step, code the appropriate new filtering firewall rule to allow new connections for the service

nft add rule qubes custom-forward iif == "eth0" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.0.xx tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept

Note: If you do not wish to limit the IP addresses connecting to the service, remove ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 from the rules

Once you have confirmed that the counters increase, store these commands in the script /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script

[user@sys-net user]$ sudo -i
[root@sys-net user]# nano /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script

Content of /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script in sys-firewall:

#!/bin/sh

# create the dnat chain for qubeDEST if it doesn't already exist
if nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority filter +1 ; policy accept; }'
then
  # create the dnat rule
  nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iif == "eth0" tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.0.xx

  # allow forwarded traffic
  nft add rule qubes custom-forward iif == "eth0" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.0.xx tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
fi

If the service should be available to other VMs on the same system, do not forget to specify the additional rules described earlier in this guide.

4. Allow packets into the qube to reach the service

No routing is required in the destination qube, only filtering.

For the following example, we assume that the target VM running the web server has the IP address 10.137.0.xx

The according rule to allow the traffic is:

nft add rule qubes custom-input tcp dport 443 ip daddr 10.137.0.xx ct state new,established,related counter accept

To make it persistent, you need to add this command in the script /rw/config/rc.local:

[user@qubeDEST user]$ sudo -i
[root@qubeDEST user]# echo 'nft add rule qubes custom-input tcp dport 443 ip daddr 10.137.0.xx ct state new,established,related counter accept' >> /rw/config/rc.local

This time testing should allow connectivity to the service as long qubeDEST is running and the service is up :-)

Where to put firewall rules

Implicit in the above example scripts, but worth calling attention to: for all qubes except those supplying networking, nftables commands should be added to the /rw/config/rc.local script. For service qubes supplying networking (sys-firewall and sys-net inclusive), nftables commands should be added to /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script.

Firewall troubleshooting

Firewall logs are stored in the systemd journal of the qube the firewall is running in (probably sys-firewall). You can view them by running sudo journalctl -u qubes-firewall.service in the relevant qube. Sometimes these logs can contain useful information about errors that are preventing the firewall from behaving as you would expect.

An effective console utility to troubleshoot network is tcpdump, it can be used to display network packets entering or leaving network interfaces.

For instance, if you want to check if your network interface eth0 is receiving packets on port TCP 443 from the network 192.168.x.y, you can run this command:

tcpdump -i eth0 -nn dst port 443 and src net 192.168.x.y/24

This can be used effectively in a destination qube and its Network VM to see if forwarding / NAT rules are working.

Nftables tips

A simple way to experiment changes with your ruleset can be achieved by saving the current working ruleset in two files, one for backup and the other for making changes.

By adding flush ruleset at the top of the file, you can achieve atomic update, which mean the new ruleset would replace the current one only if it fully succeed to load.

You can dump the ruleset in two files using the following command:

nft list ruleset | tee nft_backup | tee nft_new_ruleset

Then, edit nft_new_ruleset, add flush ruleset on top and make changes, load it with nft -f nft_new_ruleset.

You can revert to the original ruleset with the following commands:

nft flush ruleset && nft -f nft_backup