We have published Qubes Canary #24. The text of this canary is reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary #24 in the qubes-secpack:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-024-2020.txt

Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read it:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

View all past canaries:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/



                    ---===[ Qubes Canary #24 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is September 8, 2020.

2. There have been 58 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

    427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of December 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.

Special announcements
----------------------

None.

Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised.  This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.

The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.

Proof of freshness
-------------------

Tue, 08 Sep 2020 01:45:14 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Germany Debates Halting Contentious Russian Pipeline Project
Monetary Policy Expert David Marsh: "We Are Witnessing the End of Independent Central Banks"
How Feces and Other Bodily Fluids Can Help Track COVID Outbreaks
Russian Patient: The Kremlin, Belarus and the Attack on Alexei Navalny
Nord Stream 2 Troubles: An Uncertain Future for the German-Russian Pipeline

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Trump Emerges as Inspiration for Germany’s Far Right
Aided by Modern Ingenuity, a Taste of Ancient Judean Dates
Aleksei Navalny Out of a Coma and Responsive, German Doctors Say
London’s Bridges Really Are Falling Down
Truck Bomb in Somalia Kills 3 and Wounds 3, Including a U.S. Soldier

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Australian journalists flown out of China 'amid diplomatic standoff'
Michael Cohen's Trump book: The ex-lawyer's key claims
Russia's Navalny out of coma after poisoning
Wildfires burn through record area in California as blazes continue to spread
'They shot him in cold blood'

Source: Blockchain.info
00000000000000000005a914bdf7052f546448bd3459aa95b52bc1f1a62c27f6

Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!