QSB-122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 122

             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 122 ]===---

                              2026-11-06

            Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)

User action
------------

If you update Qubes OS using the Qubes Update tool, continue to update
normally in order to receive the security updates described in the
"Patching" section below.

If you update Qubes OS using command-line tools instead of the Qubes
Update tool, you must first update dom0 by itself (without any other
qubes) via `qubes-dom0-update` in a dom0 terminal. Only after dom0 has
been successfully updated should you update all Debian and Whonix
templates and standalones via `qubes-vm-update` in a dom0 terminal. (The
Qubes Update tool automatically handles updating in the correct order.)

Do not attempt to update any qube using the `apt` command directly, as
this bypasses built-in Qubes OS update security measures. Use only the
Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents in the order described
above. [1]

After updating dom0 and all Debian and Whonix templates and standalones,
we recommend restarting all Debian and Whonix qubes to ensure the
updates take effect.

Summary
--------

On 2026-11-04, the Debian security team published DSA 6607-1, "apt
security update" (CVE-2026-109518) [3]:
| Max Justicz discovered a vulnerability in the APT package manager. APT
| can merge two different package downloads after an HTTP redirect gives
| them the same URI. Improper file handling when resuming an HTTP
| download allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to replace a package
| after verification, resulting in the execution of arbitrary code as
| root.

Also see "APT-2026-11-01 security update." [4]

Impact
-------

An attacker who controls an update mirror or who can modify network
traffic can attempt to exploit this vulnerability in order to compromise
Debian and Whonix qubes.

Affected systems
-----------------

Qubes OS systems containing Debian and Whonix qubes are affected.

Qubes OS systems containing only Fedora (or other non-APT-based) qubes
are not affected.

Discussion
-----------

By default, the Advanced Package Tool (APT) verifies downloaded packages
via signed repository metadata. This allows for using package
repositories without having to trust the server hosting them or the
transport method used to download them. The vulnerability under
discussion breaks this mechanism. An attacker who successfully exploits
this vulnerability can manipulate the packages that APT downloads and
installs, potentially leading to complete compromise of the affected
qube. A successful attack requires one or more of the following:

 - The attacker controls the server on which the repository is hosted
   (e.g., a third-party mirror).

 - The transport mechanism is not authenticated (e.g., plain HTTP), and
   the attacker can tamper with the connection to the server.

 - An independent vulnerability allows the attacker to achieve one of
   the above (e.g., exploiting a bug in the server or compromising a
   trusted certificate authority (CA) or a digital certificate issued by
   such an authority).

In Qubes OS, Debian and Whonix qubes use HTTPS for APT repositories by
default, which eliminates the second (man-in-the-middle) attack vector.
(Users who have manually changed their configurations to use plain HTTP
for any repositories are still affected. Users who have manually
installed unofficial APT-based qubes besides Debian and Whonix are also
affected.)

Normally, we do not release Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) to address
vulnerabilities that affect qubes only internally without affecting the
rest of Qubes OS, since such vulnerabilities do not undermine the Qubes
security model. (On the contrary, the security model is built on the
assumption that such vulnerabilities are inevitable.)

However, the vulnerability under discussion is somewhat special. While
it affects qubes only internally, it could allow an attacker to
compromise templates, which are used as a basis for creating other
qubes, such as app and service qubes. If a template is compromised, then
all the qubes based on that template will also be compromised. App qubes
operate directly on user data, and service qubes can affect user privacy
(e.g., Whonix and VPN proxy qubes).

In Qubes OS, we take special precautions to make templates difficult to
compromise. For example, we block all network connections to and from
templates, with one exception: We allow templates to connect to an
"update proxy" that allows the template to retrieve updates while
protecting users from accidentally using templates to perform risky
activities, such as browsing the web.

Since the vulnerability under discussion has the potential to subvert
these defenses, and since we can address it via the Qubes update system,
we've decided to issue this QSB and its attendant security updates.

Patching
---------

The packages below contain security updates to the Qubes update tools
that address the vulnerability described in this bulletin. After these
updates are applied, the Qubes update tools will update APT in a safe
way.

  For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
  - qubes-core-dom0-linux 4.3.25
  - qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-update 4.3.4

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed
as described in the "User action" section above.

Credits
--------

See the Debian and APT security advisories. [3][4]

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html
[3] https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2026/msg00526.html
[4] https://lists.debian.org/deity/2026/11/msg00005.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Source: qsb-122-2026.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature

Source: qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature

Source: qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.)

Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1

(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.)

View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
   
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
gpg> fpr
pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
 Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.

Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.

Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

gpg> trust
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
   
  1 = I don't know or won't say
  2 = I do NOT trust
  3 = I trust marginally
  4 = I trust fully
  5 = I trust ultimately
  m = back to the main menu
   
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
   
gpg> q

Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.

Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.)

$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg:               imported: 16
gpg:              unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u

Verify signed Git tags.

$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
   
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]

The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.

Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]

Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.

For this announcement (QSB-122), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-122-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-122-2026.txt

You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-122 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

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